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1 Introduction 
Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and 
programmes on the environment (the ‘SEA Directive’)1 is a novel kind of legal 
instrument.  In broad terms, it extends the well-established concept of environmental 
assessment by applying it to certain government plans and programmes, and it 
reconfigures its requirements, making them more demanding in some respects.2  
However, as European legislative debates around the precise formulation of the 
Directive reveal, it is politically contentious.3  This is because the Directive does not 
merely extend the application of an existing environmental regulatory tool but it 
makes inroads into the inner workings of national governments in areas that are 
arguably beyond the competence of the EU institutions.  The Directive makes a move 
that is controversial not only in terms of EU competence,4 but also for its potential 
constitutional implications in Member State legal orders.  This latter point was made 
plain in the recent decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in R (HS2 Action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Parliament and Council Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and 
programmes on the environment [2001] OJ L197/30 (‘SEA Directive’). 
2 Particularly by requiring rigorous assessment of alternative options to a proposed plan or programme: 
SEA Directive, art 5(1). 
3 See Robert McCracken and Ned Westaway, ‘The History and Context of the SEA Directive’ in the 
current volume, #. 
4 Thus, for example, it modifies processes for formulating plans for land use, infrastructure policy, 
water management: SEA Directive, art 3(2) and 3(4). 
	   2	  
Alliance Limited) v The Secretary of State for Transport and anor (‘HS2’),5 in which 
the Court was at pains to discern and decide how the application of the Directive did 
not (and could not) impede parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom.6  This 
chapter reflects on this controversial legal picture in UK law in two ways.  First, it 
considers how the Directive is in fact unremarkable in environmental law – Section 2 
examines how the Directive is one of many ways in which environmental law 
constitutes and limits policy relating to environmental matters.  However, it does 
present an interesting example of how this phenomenon occurs, and Section 3 of the 
chapter considers how the extent of the Directive’s constitutive and limiting impact 
on policy is determined by its judicial interpretation. Second, the chapter reflects on 
the public law significance of the Directive, examining the extent to which it 
challenges or informs public law concepts and debates.  More than the Directive’s 
controversial potential to control Parliamentary decision-making, Section 4 argues 
that a particularly notable public law dimension of the Directive concerns its limiting 
of governmental and executive power. 
2 Environmental Law and Policy  
Environmental law, as a subject, provides a legal context in which questions, and 
arguably answers, about the nature of law are different.  It is not a single body of 
doctrine, supervised primarily by courts and characterized (solely) by bi-polar 
disputes between individuals or even by criminal prosecutions brought by the state.  It 
is a much messier legal context.  This is particularly because environmental law 
concerns a wide body of regulation and administrative activity that governs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 [2014] UKSC 3 (‘HS2’). 
6 See e.g. ibid at [38]-[39] (Lord Carnwath). Notably the Court was even more exercised over the 
constitutional issues raised by the prospect of reviewing Parliamentary processes for their compatibility 
with the EIA Directive.  See Denis Edwards, ‘HS2 – The First Spike’ (2014) 26(2) JEL 319. 
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environmental problems.7  Much environmental law is thus concerned with regulatory 
strategy – some of which is sui generis and even ‘non-legal’8 – and with the 
constitution of public administration.9  Within this regulatory domain, policy has a 
pervasive role in informing administrative decision-making and in constituting 
environmental regimes.  As a significant feature of administrative decision-making, 
policy is also controlled by law, so that it is itself legally constituted in significant 
ways.   The SEA Directive is a prominent example of generating this latter effect. 
What is Environmental Policy? 
In general, environmental policy is not a monolithic concept.  At its broadest, 
‘environmental policy’ refers to a course of action adopted to secure, or that tends to 
secure, a state of affairs in relation to environmental matters that is conceived to be 
desirable.10  However, this jurisprudential definition does not begin to suggest the full 
array of policy at work or otherwise implicated in environmental law.11  ‘Policy’ in 
environmental law comes in all shapes and sizes – including Ministerial statements 
and central government policy papers that set the overarching direction of 
environmental and planning regulation, to local development plans required under 
planning statutes, to regulator-generated guidance for industry concerning their 
compliance with environmental regulation, to technical reference documents on best 
industrial practice generated at the EU level, to statutory guidance required by 
particular regimes (such as land contamination) to fill in the detail of their operation. 
All these different forms of ‘policy’ need to be viewed in their own terms in order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Thus most environmental law claims that go to court in the UK are public law disputes that challenge 
administrative discretion and decision-making. 
8 Elizabeth Fisher et al, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law 
Scholarship’ (2009) 21(2) JEL 213, 225. 
9 Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing 2007). 
10 Adapting the definition in Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1994) 261. 
11 Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75, 98. 
	   4	  
identify and appraise their legal roles and effects. 
The Legal Effects and Constraint of Environmental Policy 
As indicated above, there are two broad ways in which different kinds of policy are 
relevant or implicated in environmental law.  First, some policy has legal effects.12  
These legal effects might be prescribed by the statutory framework that empowers the 
formulation of a relevant policy;13 they might arise as a matter of administrative law 
doctrine;14 and they might arise simply because, in practice, policy instruments 
contain important regulatory and technical details that dictate how an environmental 
regime in fact works.  Thus policy instruments can act as a primary source of legal 
obligations for those who are subject to a relevant regime,15 and they can also control 
acts of administrative decision-making to which they relate as a matter of public law.  
In the latter sense, Government is regularly held to account for failing to comply with 
its own policy.16  Similarly, policy documents are fundamental to the legal operation 
of the English planning regime, since a range of policies (including the National 
Planning Policy Framework, National Infrastructure Statements, Local Development 
Plans) must be taken into account in planning decisions as they are relevant.17  Even 
evolving planning policy can be found to have legal effects on decision-making in the 
planning regime.18  And whilst policies are not treated as legally binding as statutes,19 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See further Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford, Environmental Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (OUP 2013) ch 11. 
13 e.g. Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011 SI 2011/988, reg 15(2). 
14 Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13. 
15 e.g. BAT Reference documents under the EU integrated pollution prevention and control regime (see 
<http://eippcb.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reference/>, accessed 1 August 2014; Directive 2010/75/EU on 
industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) [2010] OJ L334/17, art 14(3)). 
16 e.g. R (Manchester Ship Canal) v Environment Agency [2012] EWHC 1643 (QB). 
17 Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s70(2); Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 
(PCPA), s 38(6). 
18 Cala Homes (South) Limited v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2011] 
EWCA Civ 639. 
19 Tesco Stores (n 14) [19].  See also R v Derbyshire County Council; ex p Woods [1998] Env LR 277, 
288-9, 290-2 (recognising that policies are different from statutes when it comes to their legal 
interpretation).   
	   5	  
much depends on the nature of the policy in determining its legal effects – including 
who issued the policy document,20 how well considered was its formulation,21 and 
whether the policy leaves room for judgment.22  Overall, environmental policy 
instruments have a range of legal effects, the precise nature of which can involve a 
close exercise in legal analysis that takes into account the statutory and decision-
making context, as well as the nature of the relevant policy itself. 
 Second, rather than having legal effects (or as well as having such effects), 
some policy is constituted or constrained by law.  Thus when policy is created under a 
statutory regime, it will be legally constructed by the terms of the legislation that 
empowers its creation.23  Such policy will be susceptible to challenge by way of 
judicial review if it does not conform to the relevantly applicable statutory 
framework, on grounds of illegality or the failure to take into account relevant 
considerations.24  Beyond this, the legal constraints on the high-level strategic policy 
of the government on environmental issues are of particular note.  On the one hand, it 
is a basic constitutional principle, central to administrative law, that evaluating the 
merits of high-level policy is beyond the proper scope of judicial review, and that its 
review on grounds of legality should be very limited. 25   However, in the 
environmental sphere, high-level policy is subject to legal constraints in at least three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ibid. 
21 Manchester Ship Canal (n 16) [93] and generally. 
22 Tesco Stores (n 14) [18]. See further Eloise Scotford and Jonathan Robinson, ‘UK Environmental 
Legislation and its Administration in 2013 – Achievements, Challenges and Prospects’ (2013) 25(3) 
JEL 383, 397-399. 
23 E.g. Environmental Protection Act 1990, s78YA – in relation to contaminated land regime statutory 
guidance – not only indicates what should be included in the guidance in terms of content (detailed 
provisions on defining and identifying contaminated land, and identifying the appropriate persons 
responsible for remediation), but also the procedure for formulating the guidance, including 
consultation requirements and parliamentary approval.  Aspects of policy may also be constructed by 
other, related pieces of legislation: e.g. Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010, SI 
2010/490, regs 39, 102, 103, 106. 
24 Such a challenge might also be made in relation to policy otherwise shaped by a statutory regime: 
Dimmock v Secretary of State for Education [2007] EWHC 2288 (Admin). 
25 R v Secretary of State for the Environment; ex p Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1991] UKHL 3, 
12. 
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ways.   
 First, in some cases, courts have undertaken intensive judicial review in 
relation to high-level government policy.  By applying judicial review principles 
broadly and purposively in some cases, courts have extended ‘legality’ review to 
cover the substance of policy decisions made by Government, where these have an 
environmental dimension.26  Second, administrative law doctrine may require that 
environmental policy is to be developed in a certain way.  Thus, full public 
consultation will be legally required when the Government has promised this.27  
Third, some high-level policy is also subject to statutory requirements and constraint, 
particularly when made under highly prescriptive legislation such as the Climate 
Change Act 2008,28 or under provisions implementing EU environmental legislation. 
In this third sense, there is a range of EU law constraints on high-level UK 
government policy relating to the environment, which both require and shape the 
substance of particular strategic environmental policies, 29  and which require 
environmental assessments in relation to some policies when they are likely to have 
significant environmental effects, as in the case of the SEA Directive.  It is this latter 
kind of constitutive impact or ‘constraint’ with which this chapter is directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; ex p The World Development Movement [1995] 1 All ER 
611.   See A H Hammond, ‘Judicial Review: the Continuing Interplay between Law and Policy’ (1998) 
PL 34. 
27 R (Greenpeace) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 311.  It might also be 
argued that the public should be fully consulted in relation to the formulation of any strategic UK 
environmental policy since Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention, to which the UK is a signatory, 
requires this: ibid [49]; cf HS2 [52] (Lord Carnwath concluding that the Aarhus Convention was not 
directly helpful in interpreting the public participation requirements of the SEA Directive). 
28 See Climate Change Act 2008, ss 4-10 in relation to government Carbon Budgets. 
29 E.g. river basin management plans required under Council and Parliament Directive 2000/60/EC 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L327/1, art 13; 
action programmes required under Council Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the protection of waters 
against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources [1991] OJ L375/1, art 5; and waste 
management and prevention programmes required under Council and Parliament Directive 2008/98/EC 
on waste and repealing certain Directives [2008] OJ L312/3 (Waste Framework Directive), arts 28 & 29.  
Also note the binding effect of the waste hierarchy in the Waste Framework Directive (art 4) on UK 
waste policy.  
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concerned, but as seen here, it is part of a larger legal picture relating to 
environmental policy.  In combination, these various constraints render a significant 
body of government policy subject to legal obligation and scrutiny, although the 
precise impact of any legal oversight should not be presumed.  If any of the legal 
requirements outlined above are enforced in court, much will depend on the intensity 
of any judicial review undertaken in determining whether government decision-
makers have met these legal obligations in creating or applying a particular 
environmental policy.  
 In sum, UK environmental law relies on policy to do all sorts of things that a 
UK lawyer, particularly a constitutional lawyer or theorist might initially baulk at.30   
In particular, by acting as an effective source of legal obligation in some cases and 
coming under review by the courts even when made at a high strategic level, 
environmental policy challenges the influential Dworkinian view that policy and law 
are properly separate concepts.31  This is not a legal domain where matters of policy – 
even understood in the more limited, elevated sense of ‘high-level strategic policy’ – 
are left purely to the discretion of government or Parliament.  However, this state of 
affairs is not a simple legal picture or a descriptive fait accompli.  As indicated, the 
precise legal effects of, and limits to, environmental policy are variable – they depend 
on the particular type of environmental policy and the particular legal control 
mechanism or issue at stake.  Furthermore, there are important public law questions to 
be asked about whether this legal picture presents an acceptable state of affairs.  The 
following sections consider these two issues in the context of the SEA Directive: 
examining the actual legal limits imposed by the Directive in relation to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Environmental law is not necessarily special in this respect. See e.g. the complex role of policy in 
immigration law: e.g. R (Pankina) v SSHD [2010] 3 WLR 1526. 
31 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (2nd ed, Duckworth 1978) 22-28, 84-85. 
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environmental policy of government, and considering their public law implications.     
3 The Mechanism of the SEA Directive in Constituting and 
Limiting Environmental Policy 
In determining the legal impact of the SEA Directive in relation to environmental 
policy, the first thing to note is that the Directive is not a wholesale programme for 
subjecting all ‘strategic’ environmental policy to environmental assessment.32  It is a 
more limited and precise legal mechanism.  In particular, it requires environmental 
assessment (meeting the requirements of Articles 4 and 5 of the Directive) to be 
undertaken for public33 ‘plans or programmes’ that: 
• are required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions;34 
• are likely to have significant environmental effects;35 and 
• set the framework for future development consent of projects.36  
In particular, the Directive requires an assessment of all plans and programmes that 
relate to agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy, industry, transport, waste 
management, water management, telecommunications, tourism, town and country 
planning and land use, and where such plans ‘set the framework’ for approving 
projects listed in Annexes I or II of the Environmental Assessment Directive.37  An 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 As Lord Carnwath and Lady Hale point out in HS2, the word ‘strategic’ does not actually appear in 
the text of the Directive, although commonly used to describe it in shorthand: HS2 (n 5) [35], [131]. 
33 i.e. plans and programmes ‘which are subject to preparation and/or adoption by an authority at 
national, regional or local level or which are prepared by an authority for adoption, through a 
legislative procedure by Parliament or Government’: SEA Directive, art 2(a). 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid, art 3(1). 
36 ibid, art 3(2) and (4). 
37 ibid, art 3(2)(a), subject to the exception in art 3(3), i.e. cases where a plan or programme determines 
the use of small areas at local level or involves minor modifications to the plans and programmes 
included in art 3(2), unless a Member State determines they are likely to have significant 
environmental effects. 
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assessment under the Directive is also required for plans or programmes determined 
to require an assessment under Article 6 or 7 of Directive 92/43/EEC (the Habitats 
Directive),38 whether or not they ‘set the framework’ for future consent decisions.39  
Otherwise, Member States need to determine whether a relevant plan or programme 
that sets the framework for future development consent decisions is likely to have 
significant environmental effects, on a case-by-case basis and/or by specifying certain 
types of plans and programmes.40  Notably two categories of government policy are 
excluded from the scope of the Directive – plans or programmes solely aimed to serve 
national defence or civil emergency, and financial or budget plans and programmes.41  
Beyond this, identifying what kinds of government policy are in fact caught by the 
Directive involves a delicate exercise in interpretation of the Directive.42  This section 
undertakes this interpretive exercise in order to get an accurate picture of what 
governmental policy falls within the scope of the Directive, before considering the 
overall effect of the Directive in constituting and constraining such government 
policy.   
What Kinds of Government Policy Fall within the Directive?  
In determining the extent to which government policy is subject to the Directive, there 
are two main points of statutory interpretation to consider.  First, when is a plan or 
programme ‘required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions’?  The 
more broadly this phrase is defined, the more government policy will be covered.  To 
date, the interpretation of this phrase by courts has been highly ambiguous and not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora 
[1992] OJ L206/7. 
39 ibid, art 3(2)(b), subject to the same art 3(3) exception. 
40 ibid, art 3(4). 
41 ibid, art 3(8). 
42 This is not an easy exercise, as several of the chapters in this volume highlight.  See in particular the 
chapters by Stephen Ashworth, David Elvin, Valerie Fogelman, and Simon Ricketts & Juliet Munn. 
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finally resolved, at least in UK courts.  Second, similar challenges of interpretation 
arise in determining what kinds of plans and programmes ‘set the framework’ for 
future consent decisions, which again affect the scope of the Directive.  This 
requirement is not just ambiguous but it raises difficult questions about the timing of 
the Directive’s application.  Furthermore, and at least in UK law, the identity of the 
future consent decision-maker – in particular, whether they are a Member of 
Parliament or part of the executive – has a significant impact on whether a relevant 
‘plan or programme’ will be subject to the Directive’s assessment obligations. 
‘Required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions’ 
Advocate-General Kokott in Terre Wallonne indicated that the requirement in 
Article 2(a) that a plan or programme be ‘required by legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provisions’ meant that ‘freely taken political decisions on legislative 
proposals are not therefore subject to the obligation to carry out assessments’.43  If 
this were the case, then policies that were adopted on the sole initiative of the 
legislature (or one assumes on the initiative of the executive whether or not in 
legislative form) would be immune from the requirements of the Directive.  Even in 
this scenario, many plans and programmes would be caught by the Directive, at least 
in the English and UK context, since many policy documents are required by 
legislative provisions.  Thus, for example, Part IIA of the Environmental Protection 
Act 1990, establishing the contaminated land regime, operates on the basis that 
statutory guidance is issued in accordance with the requirements of section 78YA.  
More comprehensively, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 requires a 
suite of planning policy documents to be drawn up by local planning authorities as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Case C-567/10 Inter-Environnement Bruxelles ASBL v Gouvernement de la Région de Bruxelles-
Capitale, Opinion of AG Kokott (17 November 2011) para 41. 
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their ‘local development scheme’.44  Another example, in which legislation requires 
the development of more cross-cutting policy that is likely to have significant 
environmental effects, is the obligation on the government to set carbon budgets 
under the Climate Change Act 2008.45  This latter example shows how the ‘required 
by’ limit of the SEA Directive does not exempt highly political and strategic 
government policy from the scope of the Directive, even on a strict interpretation of 
the term, considering the extensive statutory construction of policy in the UK. 
 However, beyond these straightforward cases, there are other kinds of 
government policy that are likely to have significant effects on the environment, but 
which are not strictly ‘required by’ legislative measures.  It is debatable whether these 
come within the scope of the Directive.  For instance, what of policy documents likely 
to have significant effects on the environment, which are empowered, rather than 
required, by legislation (such as Ministerial guidance on the application of the waste 
hierarchy and waste collection requirements under the Waste (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2011)?46  Or similar policy documents that are regulated but not required 
by legislation (such as National Policy Statements for ‘specified descriptions of 
development’ that may be designated by a Minister under the Planning Act 2008)?47  
Or that are required by other policy documents (such as ‘Travel Plans’ under the 
National Planning Policy Framework)?48  On one view, all these kinds of policy 
instruments fall without the SEA Directive since they are not strictly ‘required’ by 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions.49  However, the picture is not that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 PCPA, s 15.  See also Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, ss 63-65. 
45 Climate Change Act 2008, s 4(1)(a). 
46 SI 2011/988, reg 15(2). 
47 Planning Act 2008, s 5. 
48 Department of Communities and Local Government, National Planning Policy Framework (2012) 
[36]. 
49 This is the view of Lords Mance and Neuberger in HS2. 
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clear-cut, in light of Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law. 
Recognising that other such policy documents might still have significant effects on 
the environment, the CJEU in Inter-Environnement Bruxelles rejected ‘a mere literal 
interpretation of [the] provision’ in Article 2(a).  In line with the Directive’s objective 
to provide for a high level of environmental protection, the Court held that:50 
plans and programmes whose adoption is regulated by national 
legislative or regulatory provisions [or presumably administrative 
provisions], which determine the competent authorities for adopting 
them and the procedure for preparing them, must be regarded as 
‘required’ within the meaning [of Article 2(a)]. 
 This expansive approach to the meaning of ‘required’ reflects the purposive 
interpretation of many environmental provisions by the CJEU,51 and it considerably 
widens the scope for government policy potentially to fall within the scope of the 
SEA Directive.  In HS2, Lady Hale indicated the possible breadth of the CJEU’s 
formulation above, in that ‘administrative provisions’ regulating the procedure for 
preparing plans or programmes could include the Government’s Consultation 
Principles,52 which apply to all forms of Whitehall policymaking.  This leaves out of 
account the CJEU’s requirement that the provisions should also ‘determine the 
competent authorities for adopting’ relevant plans and programmes, but such a 
provision would certainly cover forms of government policy which government actors 
are empowered by statute or policy to make (such as the waste guidance or National 
Policy Statements above).  All that would seem to fall outside this definition is UK 
government policy that is generated on the initiative of government, in relation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Case C-567/10 Inter-Environnement Bruxelles (CJEU, 22 March 2012) para 31 (emphasis added). 
51 e.g. Joined Cases C-418/97 & C-419/97 Arco Chemie Nederland Ltd v Minister Van 
Volkshuisvesting [2000] ECR I-4475; Case C-371/98 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, ex p First Corporate Shipping Ltd [2001] Env LR 34; Case C-127/02 
Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer 
en Visserij [2004] ECR I-7405. 
52 UK Cabinet Office, ‘Consultation Principles: Guidance’ (2013), formerly the Government’s ‘Code 
of Practice on Consultation’ (2008). 
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which there are no administrative, regulatory or legislative provisions indicating who 
should adopt the relevant policy (albeit that there do exist administrative provisions 
relating to the process of its formulation).  However, as Lord Carnwath pointed out in 
HS2, we have no definitive understanding of ‘administrative provisions’,53 which at 
its widest could mean all principles of public law, including constitutional 
conventions concerning the power of government to introduce policy and propose 
legislation.  Such a broad understanding would bring all government policy within the 
scope of the Directive, at least to the extent it is ‘regulated’ by ‘legislative, regulatory 
or administrative provisions’. 
 Rather than tackling this interpretive issue directly, the Supreme Court in HS2 
avoided deciding it, in light of their finding that the government policy document at 
issue in that case did not relevantly ‘set the framework’ for future consent of projects.  
However, the HS2 litigation did provide diametrically opposed views on the issue. 
The majority in the Court of Appeal suggested that if a plan or programme ‘set the 
framework’ for future consent decisions, it was difficult to say that it was not 
‘required by administrative provisions’.54  It is challenging to see the logic in this 
position, but it has the potential to strip the requirement in Article 2(a) of all meaning, 
which is quite the opposite of what it was intended to do (as highlighted by AG 
Kokott’s point above).55  At the other end of the spectrum, Lords Neuberger and 
Mance were strongly of the view that the CJEU had clearly got this issue wrong in 
Inter-Environnement Bruxelles: ‘in the interests of a more complete regulation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 HS2 [21]. 
54 R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWCA Civ 920 [71]. 
55 Lords Neuberger and Mance point out the ‘striking’ legislative history of the SEA Directive that led 
to this wording, including the rejection of a Commission proposal that had no provision for plans and 
programmes to be ‘required by’ law, and also a revised proposal which qualified that such plans or 
programmes must be ‘provided for in legislation or based on regulatory or administrative provisions’: 
HS2 [178]. 
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environmental developments, [the Court has given the legislative provision] a 
meaning which the European legislative clearly did not intend.’56  Their Lordships 
would like to see a fresh reference to the CJEU on the matter.57  Whichever way 
future interpretation of this provision goes, it will have an impact on the scope of 
government policy included in the Directive and on the extent to which executive 
policy making processes are subject to the requirements of the Directive. 
Setting the Framework for Future Development Consent 
Like the provision that a plan or programme must be ‘required by legislative, 
regulatory or administrative provisions’, the requirement that a plan or programme 
‘set the framework’ for future development consent of projects58 has proved an 
interpretive challenge.  Competing judicial interpretations of ‘setting the framework’ 
have included ‘being determinative’ of future development consents, ‘setting criteria’ 
for their determination, or being more loosely ‘influential’ in the determination of 
such consents.  In this way, the Court of Appeal in HS2 saw there being a ‘spectrum’ 
of ‘influence’ of relevant plans and programmes, which could be caught by the 
Directive, including potent factual influence as well as legal influence.59  In the 
Supreme Court, Lord Carnwath saw the matter more narrowly, finding that a plan or 
programme should set ‘limits on the scope of things that can be considered’ in a 
future development consent decision in order to ‘set the framework’ for such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 ibid [189]. 
57 ibid. 
58 This is a requirement for all applications of the SEA Directive except where an assessment is 
required under the Habitats Directive, as set out above: see nn 37-40 and accompanying text. 
59 R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWCA Civ 920 [54]. 
Note Lord Carnwath’s approval of counsel’s argument that the CA’s ‘influencing’ test should be 
qualified so that the influence ‘must be such as to constrain subsequent consideration, and to prevent 
appropriate account from being taken of all the environmental effects which might otherwise be 
relevant’: HS2 [40] 
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decision.60  He saw this interpretation of EU law as being ‘acte clair’, driven by the 
core purpose of the Directive:61  
One is looking for something which does not simply define the project, 
or describe its merits, but which sets the criteria by which it is to be 
determined by the authority responsible for approving it. The purpose is 
to ensure that the decision on development consent is not constrained 
by earlier plans which have not themselves been assessed for likely 
significant environmental effects. 
However, even on this narrower view, with which all members of the Supreme Court 
essentially agreed, this includes a wide range of strategic government policy.  This is 
because, in English administrative law terms, ‘setting the criteria’ that bind future 
decision-makers translates legally into setting material considerations that a future 
decision-maker must take into account where relevant (or not take into account where 
irrelevant).  Considering the extent to which policy documents have legal effects in 
administrative law terms, as discussed in Section 2 above, this means that a wide 
range of policy documents could still be seen to ‘set a framework’ for future 
development consent.  As Lord Sumption recognised in HS2, there are many different 
kinds of environmental policy with different kinds of legal effects:62 
The legal effect of these general policies may be weaker or stronger. In 
some cases development consent must be given or refused in 
accordance with the policy subject to limited exceptions, while in others 
the obligation of the planning authority is only to have regard to or take 
account of it. 
This recognises and confirms two aspects of environmental policy discussed in the 
previous section: the terms of the SEA Directive recognise that policy documents 
concerning the environment have legal effects (so that they ‘set the framework’ for 
future decisions), but these effects can vary depending on the nature of the policy 
instrument at issue. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 HS2 [49]. 
61 ibid [36] (emphasis added). 
62 HS2 [121]. 
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 The wide impact of this interpretation of the ‘setting the framework’ 
requirement can be seen by example.  On Lord Carnwath’s reasoning, at least the 
following would come within the scope of the Directive in relevantly setting the 
framework for future development consent decisions: planning policy documents of 
all types (local development schemes, the NPPF, National Policy Statements, and the 
like) in relation to planning decisions,63 waste and water management plans in relation 
to any related infrastructure planning consent or environmental permit, and potentially 
any government policy that is considered to be a material consideration in 
administrative law terms for making a consent decision.  It is notable that land-use 
and town planning policies, in particular, are seen to be the ‘paradigm’ case falling 
within the Directive’s scope.64  Even in this case, the impact of the Directive’s 
application is wide-ranging.  This is because planning policies, even if quite 
formalised in the English planning system, are highly politicised documents that 
concern issues in relation to which Member States are reluctant to cede competence.65  
The Directive’s oversight of their formulation represents a significant inroad into 
domestic policymaking and control over land-use by EU measures.  This has 
significant political and legal consequences as it seems to shift the balance of 
policymaking power between the EU and its Member States. 
 However, there are two significant limits to the scope of the Directive 
introduced by the ‘setting the framework’ requirement, at least in the UK 
governmental context and particularly in relation to highly strategic government 
policy.  The first limit concerns who the subsequent decision-maker for development 
consent is, and the second concerns the timing of the policy document that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Inter-Environnement Bruxelles (n 50) confirms this. 
64 R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWCA Civ 920 [170]. 
65 TFEU, art 192(2)(b). 
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suggested to set the framework.  Lord Carnwath’s reason for finding that the 
‘Decision and Next Steps’ document at issue in HS2 (the ‘DNS’, which committed 
the Government to its proposed HS2 strategy and set out a procedure for protecting its 
planned route and empowering its approval)66 did not set the framework for the 
decision to approve the final HS2 project was that the DNS was more like a planning 
application, since it contained extensive information about the options for the 
proposal and its merits, but crucially did not constrain the ultimate decision-maker 
who would have to approve the scheme.67  It set the terms of the debate but it did not 
set the framework for the final decision by constraining it.  This was particularly 
because Parliament was the ultimate decision-maker in relation to the HS2 scheme.  
As the majority highlighted in the Court of Appeal, ‘Parliament is constitutionally 
sovereign and free to accept or reject statements of Government policy as it sees fit, 
and the court should not seek to second-guess what Parliament will do’.68  Lord 
Carnwath agreed: ‘[f]ormally, and in reality, Parliament is autonomous, and not 
bound by any “criteria” contained in previous government statements.’69   This 
indicates that the constitutional supremacy and independence of Parliament was 
critical in determining whether or not the DNS ‘set the framework’ in the HS2 case.  
This finding sets a bright-line limit to the application of the SEA Directive, in relation 
to policies and related consent decisions that are so ‘controversial and politically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 UK Government, High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future – Decisions and Next  
Steps (Cm 8247, 2012). 
67 HS2 [37]. 
68 R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWCA Civ 920 [56]. See 
also R (Buckinghamshire County Council, HS2 Action Alliance and ors) v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2013] EWHC 481 (Admin) [95] (Ouseley J).  
69 HS2 [39]. Cf Sullivan LJ in dissent in the CA who found there was no clear distinction between the 
government’s role as promoter of the scheme and its role in the Parliamentary decision-making 
process.  The government has a dual role: ‘Parliament is constitutionally distinct from the executive, 
but members of the Government are members of Parliament’: R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v 
Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWCA Civ 920 [173].   
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sensitive’ that they are ultimately decided by Parliament.70  
 However, Parliament as subsequent decision-maker is the easy case for 
determining whether the SEA Directive applies, when put in such constitutional 
terms.  But what about when the subsequent decision-maker is a planning Minister or 
a local government planning authority or other administrator/regulator?  Presumably, 
in that case, a policy statement such as the DNS could have set the framework for a 
future consent decision, rendering the SEA Directive applicable.  Sullivan LJ made 
this point in the Court of Appeal, which counsel for the Government had accepted.71  
For the HS2 project, development consent for such a nationally significant project 
could have been sought through the development consent procedure for nationally 
significant infrastructure projects under Planning Act 2008, or by an order for a 
scheme of national significance under the Transport and Works Act 1992.  Either 
way, the DNS would have ‘set the framework’ in that it would have been a material 
consideration that the decision-maker considering ultimately whether to approve the 
scheme by either route would have had to take into account.  
 The second limit (or complexity) that arises from the Directive’s ‘setting the 
framework’ requirement relates to timing, particularly in relation to multi-stage 
decision-making processes for project consent, which come after a long gestation 
period in background policy development.  The Directive is designed to apply and 
intervene in this kind of process before the final consent decision, if ‘major effects on 
the environment [are] predetermined by earlier planning measures’.72  But the exactly 
moment at which it will apply can be difficult to pinpoint.  In a complex and multi-
stage policy and decision-making process, it might be hard to discern at what point in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWCA Civ 920 [56]. 
71 ibid [151]. 
72 HS2 [35] (emphasis added). 
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a series of government White Papers, other Command Papers, Ministerial Statements 
and National Policy Statements, there is a certain document that constrains a final 
decision as to whether a particular sewage treatment plant, a bridge, a power plant, an 
airport, a train line will go ahead.   The stories of airports and nuclear policy over the 
last decade or so certainly suggest that final project outcomes are not always obvious 
or predetermined by strategic governmental decision-making processes, even when 
there may be administrative law constraints in relation to how those kinds of 
governmental policy should evolve.73  Outside the more structured strategic planning 
documents mandated by statute, such as National Policy Statements under the 
Planning Act 2008, it will not always be obvious (and will no doubt depend on the 
facts) whether the government has effectively constrained future consent decision-
making through issuing a policy statement.  This is a challenging position for the 
government when devising high-level policies relating to national infrastructure and 
land use planning, in relation to which there are multiple, often conflicting socio-
political considerations; in relation to which policy positions can change through 
debate and discussion; and for which the government believes it (or Parliament) 
contains ultimate decision-making power.74   
 It is an even more challenging position for the courts, in a constitutional sense, 
in considering when to intervene in such complex policy and decision-making 
processes.  This difficulty is highlighted by the fact that courts are uncomfortable in 
intervening to test the legality of strategic decision-making processes that are ongoing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 e.g. R (Greenpeace) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 311 (Admin).  See 
also R (London Borough of Hillingdon) v SS for Transport [2010] EWHC 626 (Admin). 
74 And the government might need this flexibility not to pre-determine the final result politically, 
particularly if there is a change of government. 
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and politically sensitive.75  The likelihood of this kind of intervention is somewhat 
minimised by Lord Carnwath’s finding that mere influence on final decision-making, 
even in the form of potent arguments put forward for a particular proposal, is not 
enough for a government policy to fall within the SEA regime.76  However, as set out 
above,77 the Directive’s ‘setting the framework’ requirement seems to depend, in 
English law at least, on the extent to which policy documents and statements are 
legally material and relevant considerations in relation to final consent decisions 
(rather than on whether they predetermine the environmental impacts of a final 
project, for instance).  As Section 2 set out, English law has increasingly recognised 
the legal effects of environmental policy instruments in administrative law terms, 
although the extent of their legal relevance varies depending on who issued the 
relevant policy, how well considered it was, and so on.  However, on its current 
judicial interpretation, the SEA Directive does not seem to recognise that certain plans 
or programmes may ‘set the framework’ to different degrees – it seems that any legal 
effect will do.78  For multi-stage policy and decision-making processes, this suggests 
that the precise point at which the SEA Directive might bight in such a process can be 
unpredictable, and might not reflect the point at which key environmental impacts of 
a project are most fully constrained and predetermined.  A problematic scenario thus 
arises in that, if the government seeks to gives some assurance of the direction of 
travel for a certain kind of strategic project, for example concerning a major road 
network, an airport or planned trainline, it becomes more likely that the Directive 
might apply to require assessment of the planned project when the government is of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See Hillingdon (n 73); HS2 (particularly in relation to the EIA challenge at this stage of the process 
of considering and finalising the parameters of the HS2 project: see Lord Reed [93]-[97].) 
76 HS2 [41] (‘A test based on the potency of the influence could have the paradoxical result that the 
stronger the case made in favour of a proposal, the greater the need for strategic assessment.’). 
77 See nn 61-61 and accompanying text. 
78 Cf HS2 [121] (Lord Sumption). 
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the view that its shape and conditions are not yet set but still open to discussion and 
change through policy development.  Legal challenges at such points might be 
unhelpful in the ongoing process of debate relating to a future project, and they might 
fail to pursue the central purpose of the Directive, which is to ensure that 
environmental impacts are assessed when they are actually decided ‘upstream’ in a 
decision-making process.79 
How the Directive Constitutes and Constrains Government Policy 
Assuming that the SEA Directive applies in relation to a wide range of government 
policy documents, it then constitutes and constrains that policy and related political 
decision-making in a number of ways.  As Section 2 highlighted, these are not 
unusual impacts in environmental law.  First, the Directive constitutes policy by 
prescribing part of the process for its formulation – a prescribed environmental 
assessment needs to be carried out during the preparation of the relevant plan or 
programme,80 which requires the preparation of an environmental report:81 
in which the likely significant effects on the environment of 
implementing the plan or programme, and reasonable alternatives 
taking into account the objectives and the geographical scope of the 
plan or programme, are identified, described and evaluated.  
The report, along with the draft plan or programme, must then be made available to 
certain authorities and the public for comment.82  The outcome of that consultation 
and the report itself must then be taken into consideration in the adoption of the final 
plan or programme, thus constraining its final formulation.83   
 In one sense, these requirements simply add to the process of policy-making.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 HS2 [155] (Lord Carnwath).  See also Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Blazing Upstream? Strategic Environmental 
Assessment as “Hot” Law’ in the current volume. 
80 SEA Directive, art 4(1). 
81 ibid, art 5(1). 
82 ibid, art 6. 
83 ibid, art 8. 
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They do not directly prescribe the substantive outcome of an SEA process as it feeds 
into the design of a plan or programme.  However, as the HS2 litigation showed, 
conducting an SEA can add time, which can be politically and financially costly or 
significant.  Furthermore, it requires a deeper fleshing out of ‘reasonable 
alternatives’.84  Article 5 of the Directive requires that reasonable alternatives are 
identified and evaluated in an SEA environmental report, which must then be taken 
into account in finalising the relevant plan or programme.85  This raises the possibility 
of irrational decision-making – that is, decision-making that is open to legal challenge 
– if the government pursues a plan or programme where there exist other ‘reasonable’ 
alternatives (taking into account the objectives and the geographical scope of the 
relevant plan or programme) 86  that are less environmentally damaging.  This 
apparently procedural requirement to consider alternatives can thus act as a 
substantive constraint on the formulation of strategic government policy, affecting a 
plan or programme’s final shape.87  This is the main reason that the appellants in the 
HS2 litigation were so concerned to have the project subject to strategic 
environmental assessment, so that reasonable alternatives to the proposed HS2 rail 
route would have to be considered and, if found to be feasible and less 
environmentally harmful, ideally adopted.   
 The extent of this substantive constraint on policymaking may not be quite so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 ibid, art 5(1).  Cf the requirement to consider alternatives under the EIA Directive at the time of the 
HS2 litigation: Parliament and Council Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of 
certain public and private projects on the environment [2012] OJ L26/1, art 5(3)(d). Note the EIA 
Directive has since been made more demanding in this respect after its latest revision: see now 
art 5(1)(d) after Directive 2014/52/EU [2014] OJ L124/1. 
85 ibid, art 8.   
86 ibid. 
87 This hybrid procedural/substantive character is not confined to SEA.  There are also different ways 
of framing the understanding of EIA, which does not contain as much substantive direction as SEA.  
For example, it can be seen as a process that can embody a range of different environmental values and 
politics, rather than simply being an instrumental procedure.  See Fisher, Lange and Scotford (n 12) 
847-853. 
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significant, in light of the Supreme Court’s apparent acceptance that the alternatives 
required to be considered by an SEA environmental report would need to achieve the 
same end as the proposed plan or programme (in the case of HS2, constructing a new 
high speed rail network over the designated area of the UK).88  In this respect, much 
depends on how the ‘end’ of a plan or programme is defined, and who has the 
authority to identify that goal.  However, overall, the SEA process does, in a real way, 
limit and constrain how a government can introduce and decide on policy matters that 
come within the scope of the Directive. 
4. Public Law Implications and Reflections 
So why does all this matter?  In one sense, the mechanism of the SEA Directive is a 
novel and interesting legal development, which is a tricky legal puzzle to get to grips 
with.  It’s good business for environmental lawyers to have knotty legal instruments 
like this to figure out.  However, for the English lawyer more generally, the Directive 
has notable implications, particularly in public law terms.  This final section sets out 
three ways (and there are no doubt more) in which the Directive is remarkable as a 
matter of public law, indicating how the potential scope of the Directive challenges 
principles or informs debates in English public law.  These relate to the role of law in 
controlling executive power, the constitutional and institutional competence of the 
courts, and the impact of EU law on the public law of the United Kingdom. 
 First, the most startling aspect of the Directive is the fact that its very premise 
is to make inroads into the policymaking function of government.  It is not surprising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 HS2 [47]-[48] (Lord Carnwath accepting the view of Ouseley J below, unchallenged in the Supreme 
Court). Cf Habitats Directive (n 38) art 6(4) where ‘alternative solutions’ is interpreted by the 
Commission to include doing nothing if the impact on protected sites or species is particularly 
significant, as well as considering ‘alternative locations or routes, different scales or designs of 
development, or alternative processes’: Commission, ‘Guidance Document on Article 6(4) of the 
“Habitats Directive” 92/43/EEC’ (2007/2012) 6. 
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that it was a controversial measure to pass in the EU legislature.  And while the 
Directive does not apply in relation to all government plans and programmes that will 
have major environmental effects (although there was some judicial dismay in HS2 
that it does not do so),89 the analysis in Section 3 shows that it has an extensive reach, 
particularly in an era of highly structured and open policymaking at Whitehall.  This 
legal intrusion into executive policymaking is constitutionally remarkable, an 
implication which was masked (or avoided) in the HS2 litigation due to the ultimate 
decision-maker in that case being Parliament.  Whilst, in one sense, there is nothing 
contentious about Ministers or executive actors being subject to legislative constraint 
(in this case The Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 
2004),90 it is the nature of this legislative constraint implementing the SEA Directive 
that is constitutionally significant, in that it limits the power of government to set 
policy.  In doing so, it defines and partly resets the balance of UK executive power.  
In 1998, Eric Barendt described the powers of the executive, within the constitutional 
settlement of the UK, as follows:91 
The executive is not only the most powerful, but it is the most difficult 
of the three branches of government to explain.  In the first place, it is 
hard to describe exactly what are executive functions.  They are much 
more varied than legislative and judicial functions.  The choice of 
Prime Minister, the formation of governments, the dissolution of 
Parliament, the making of treaties, and the conduct of war all involve 
executive decisions.  The preparation of general economic and social 
policy, as well as its detailed administration, are equally executive 
functions...   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 HS2 [134] (Lady Hale).  See also Sullivan LJ in the Court of Appeal who concluded: ‘the “High 
Speed Rail Strategy” set out in the DNS is a prime candidate for an SEA if the objectives of the 
Directive, to provide for a high level of protection for the environment, and to ensure that certain plans 
and programmes which are “likely to have significant effects” on the environment are subject to an 
SEA, are not to be frustrated. The Respondent was not able to identify any current UK project which is 
likely to have more significant effects on the environment’: R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v 
Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWCA Civ 920 [164]. 
90 SI 2004/1633.  This is the rule of law: see Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution (10th ed, McMillan & Co, London 1959) 327. 
91 Eric Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (OUP 1998) 107-108 (emphasis added). 
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Other scholars have similarly highlighted the wide-ranging powers of the executive.  
In 1964, Birch argued that the UK had in fact shifted from a Westminster 
(parliamentary) form of government to a Whitehall form of government.92  More 
recently, Diana Woodhouse has emphasised the scope of policymaking power that 
now exists beyond the reach of Ministerial responsibility to Parliament.93  However, 
the SEA Directive moves in the reverse direction, curtailing the policymaking 
freedom of the executive and subjecting it to legal constraint.  Thus, even where the 
Government or a particular Minister is not acting under statutory mandate in 
proposing and developing a policy, as it has the power to do, the SEA Directive may 
well apply to construct and limit the process of government in developing that policy 
rather than in simply applying it.94  If it was already difficult to explain the functions 
of the executive,95 the SEA Directive seems to have made matters more complicated 
and to have reduced to some extent the powers of one branch of government in the 
UK.96   
 This impact is highlighted by the extent to which the Directive, and judicial 
oversight of it, can be construed to apply in advance of the final formulation of 
governmental policy that has any environmental impact and dimension (which covers 
quite a lot of policy areas).  The whole point of the Directive is to prevent pre-
determined decisions that will have significant effects on the environment, but, in 
achieving that aim, the Directive has scope to intervene in politically sensitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 A H Birch, Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British Constitution 
(University of Toronto Press 1964). 
93 Diana Woodhouse, ‘Ministerial Responsibility’ in Vernon Bogdanor (ed), The British Constitution in 
the Twentieth Century (OUP 2003). 
94 See Section 2 for how the latter already happens in environmental law. 
95 See the related complexity in analysing the concept of ministerial responsibility: Woodhouse (n 93). 
96 Cf Lords Neuberger and Mance on the EIA Directive: ‘Nothing in the Directive suggests that it is 
aimed at excluding either political involvement or reasoning based on political policy decisions from 
planning decisions.  On the contrary, the recognition that projects may legitimately be approved by 
specific legislative act constitutes express recognition of the legitimacy of such factors’: (HS2 [209]). 
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processes.  As seen in Section 3 above, this gives rise to some legal complexities 
about the timing at which such intervention should take place, particularly since not 
all policies will pre-empt or constrain ultimate project consent decisions, but the 
Directive certainly provides a lever for judicial intervention in policymaking 
processes to test their legality at a developmental stage.  This kind of legal impact is 
not something that public lawyers have spent a lot of time thinking about.  The 
extensive theorising that has gone into thinking about public law in the courts has 
mainly concerned judicial review challenges in relation to discrete administrative 
decisions,97 rather than being concerned with legally testing the path of governmental 
policy formulation and decision-making as it goes along, including considering its 
substantive formulation. If nothing else, the Directive, and its potential for triggering 
judicial review claims, opens up new ground for public lawyers in thinking about the 
nature of judicial review and administrative law. 
 However it also leads to the second key public law issue that the Directive 
challenges: the constitutional and institutional competence of the courts.  Any 
normative statement as to the proper constitutional role of the courts requires a 
particular theoretical approach to be taken to the UK state, which then informs the 
appropriate balance of power between the courts, Parliament and the executive.98  To 
the extent that a defensible constitutional model of the UK state provides that the 
courts have no constitutional competence in expressing views on social or economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See e.g. Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review’ in 
Christopher Forsyth, Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart Publishing 2000). 
98 Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd ed, CUP 2009) #.  The existence of 
different normative models can also lead to a ‘somewhat disconnected heap of [intellectual] activities’ 
in theorising about UK constitutional law: Geoffrey Marshall, ‘The Constitution: Theory and 
Interpretation’ in Vernon Bogdanor (ed), The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century (OUP 
2003). 
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issues, or on any matters of ‘policy’,99 the role of the courts in reviewing government 
plans or programmes may appear problematic.  However, one may argue that there is 
nothing improper with the courts enforcing the requirements of the Environmental 
Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004 – their legislative imprimatur 
can properly be upheld by the courts by way of judicial review.  As Dicey pointed 
out, ‘[executive p]owers, however extraordinary, which are conferred or sanctioned 
by statute, are never really unlimited, for they are confined by the words of the Act 
itself and, what is more, by the interpretation put upon the statute by the judges.’100  
However, the more broadly the requirements of the Directive are interpreted (how far 
‘administrative’ provisions are construed, and what the full extent of measures are 
that might ‘set the framework’ for future consent decisions), the more that the courts 
may be involved in resetting policymaking.  If not expressing a view on policy 
matters, they may well be involved in discounting the significance of the executive’s 
views and function, which does seem like a shift in their constitutional role, arguably 
beyond the limits of their constitutional competence.   
 Whichever model of the state, and of the rule of law, sets that constitutional 
frame, it is more straightforward to argue that the Directive redefines the ‘institutional 
competence’ of the courts.101  Simply put, in reviewing the lawful formulation of a 
plan or programme under the Directive, the courts will be able to test and check one 
aspect of substantive input into plans and programmes – that concerning their 
environmental effects – where those plans and programmes have multiple social 
aspects and involve polycentric decision-making processes.  In this way, the 
institutional competence of the courts is being both widened (by widening the scope 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 R (Hammersmith & Fulham LBC) v Secretary of State for the Environment [1991] AC 521; Jowell (n 
97) 330. Cf Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (2nd ed, OUP 2011) #. 
100 Dicey (n 90) 413. 
101 See Jowell (n 97) 330. 
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of what constitute reviewable ‘legal’ issues) and reoriented (towards the consideration 
of substantive environmental issues). 
 The third public law issue, more a debate, which is informed by the SEA 
Directive, concerns the impact of EU law on English and UK public law.  If the above 
two impacts are indeed being felt on the English constitutional landscape – the 
increased legal control of executive power and a reframing of the constitutional (and 
institutional) competence of the courts – then that means that EU law, through the 
SEA Directive, is impacting on the constitutional architecture of English law.  The 
difficult UK public law cases that have dealt with the clash of EU and UK 
constitutional orders to date have focused primarily on threats posed by EU legislative 
measures to the supremacy of Parliament.102  The impact of the SEA Directive 
examined in this chapter shows that there are other aspects of the UK constitutional 
order that are susceptible to change by the implementation of EU law.  The 
lawfulness, or at least the constitutional understanding, of this influence is yet to be 
fully worked out.103  Yet again, environmental law challenges us to think about public 
law concepts in a different light, and to reframe our legal analysis accordingly. 
5 Conclusion 
The recognition of the important role of policy in environmental law is not surprising 
for the environmental law scholar or practitioner, but it is one that raises quite 
fundamental questions about the nature of law in relation to environmental problems, 
and which might be more surprising (or at least interesting) to a constitutional lawyer.  
Environmental law is not merely an applied law subject; it reflects interesting insights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 R (Factortame Limited and others) v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] UKHL 13; Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin). 
103 Cf constitutional issues raised in HS2 in relation to the EIA Directive: see HS2 (Lord Reed in 
particular) and Edwards (n 6). 
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about other legal areas, and even shapes them.  This chapter has shown that this is 
particularly the case in relation to the SEA Directive.  This might not seem obvious 
from a first glance at the Directive and its purpose, as Lady Hale states in HS2:104  
the aim of the Directive is not to ensure that all development proposals 
which will have major environmental effects are preceded by a strategic 
environmental assessment; rather, it is to ensure that future 
development consent for projects is not constrained by decisions which 
have been taken “upstream” without such assessment, thus pre-empting 
the environmental assessment to be made at project level. 
 
However, a closer examination of the Directive, and its potential scope in constituting 
and limiting, and in some cases requiring judicial review of, government policy shows 
that its impact on issues of English public law can be significant.  This raises 
questions about the proper roles of the executive and the courts, and the constitutional 
impact of EU law in the UK legal order.  In short, this chapter argues that 
environmental law offers a different and challenging legal perspective for thinking 
about important questions of public law.   
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